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Communicating Effectively in Times of Crisis
By Michael Alan Hamlin
April 30, 2001

Everyone who was surprised when pro-Erap rallies at Edsa last week turned semi-serious raise your hand. That little exercise — the hand-raising exercise, not the rallies — demonstrates two things. First, a crisis can never be dealt with unless it’s acknowledged. Anyone who thinks that the impact of the rallies does not seriously affect international investor perceptions of the Philippines, for instance, should sit in the back of the room. You just don’t get it.

Second, ineffective communications can make a crisis — even one that's not acknowledged — far worse than it needs to be. Anyone who thinks that telling poor people: 1) that they don't matter; 2) that they are boorish because they pee on church property; and, 3) that they are ugly because they are missing one or more teeth, doesn't get them riled up should also sit in the back of the room. All one has to do is look at Cardinal Jaime Sin's survey numbers - according to one pollster an endorsement by the Cardinal is a political death wish - to understand the impact of an angry, as well as poor, electorate.

I spent most of last week running communication workshops and coaching sessions for top executives for a large international organization, and so couldn't help wonder how bizarrely mystifying the administration's handling of the arrest of the former president and the subsequent rallies turned out. Let's consider the way it was done, and whether there wasn't a better way.

Like most people, I'm assuming that some sort of negotiations preceded the arrest of the former president. I'd be surprised if any sort of agreement was reached, however, since the administration resorted to the Erap tactic of overwhelming force to take the once proud action hero to jail. As a result, the administration created for itself the perception of being mean spirited, vindictive, and petty in its determination to humiliate Mr. Estrada. Mr. Estrada may be heavy handed himself, but by assuming that same posture, the administration brought itself down to his level (Or are these it's true colors?).

Even if the negotiations for Mr. Estrada's arrest didn't go the way the administration wanted, tell me, wouldn't the administration have looked better by saying something to this effect: "An arrest warrant has been issued, and the Sandiganbayan has ruled that the former president be remanded to custody. In deference to the former chief executive, we are requesting that he appear at Camp Crame (or wherever) before the end of the week."?

If the administration had issued such a statement, it would have been seen as fair-minded and mature and above the nastiness that instead has characterized the episode. And it is likely that Mr. Estrada would have wisely acceded to the request, since to do otherwise would have made him appear unworthy of the administration's gesture. While rallies would still have no doubt still taken place, they would not have enjoyed the ironically moral ascendancy that they now do. Meanwhile, international investors - the few who care anyway - would have been spared another round of street protests; instead, they would have seen a government determined to move on with the business and substance of governance.

When Mr. Estrada's supporters failed to disappear after their hero had been unceremoniously carted away, mug shot, and left on his shaky cot, the administration flippantly suggested — in a fashion reminiscent of Senator John Osmeña — that the scraggily protestors were deadbeats who matter little, or probably not at all in the larger scheme of Philippine politics. That's worse than naïve, I'm afraid, because any politician that continues to solidly hold — and has done so for years — 25 percent of the electorate is in fact pretty doggone important whether he is in jail or in exile.

While it is unlikely that the administration could ever win over Mr. Estrada's loyal supporters, has making them monstrously mad helped the administration? Obviously no. Instead the administration has come conspicuously close to turning a significant but effectively if temporarily marginalized block of the electorate into a more-than-reasonably credible force. And this development will dominate news on the Philippines for days and possibly weeks to come (It's good that the election of a new Japanese prime minister and continuing U.S.-China tensions are dominating the international news, significantly diverting attention from the Philippines.). The effect is despairingly apparent in the stock and currency markets.

Fortunately for the administration, it's not too late to start communicating effectively, and demonstrating its willingness to address Estrada's not-so-unreasonable concerns. No, that's not to suggest house arrest, which would be inappropriate for a number of reasons. Instead, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo should say that she and her advisers mucked things up, and their sorry for unnecessarily offending sensibilities. And yes, by-the-way, every citizen does happen to be important, and while the government may not have the obligation to take care of them in the way Mr. Estrada always said he would (but didn't), it does have the obligation to listen to them, and to respect their views. Oh, and they should do it in Filipino.

It's not just that there's little to gain from alienating so many voters. It's what's being lost in the meantime. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe this government came into being to make things better, not unnecessarily more chaotic, and unproductive.

(Mr. Hamlin is managing director of the consultancy TeamAsia and the author of two books on Asian economies and managing in Asia. His latest book is The New Asian Corporation: Managing for the Future in Post-Crisis Asia. His e-mail address is mahamlin@teamasia.com.ph.)

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