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Who's Bamboozling Whom?
By Michael Alan Hamlin
November 22-24, 2002

Ivan P. Hall isn't your run-of-the-mill disaffected gaijin, but he's trying hard to become one. Or at least that's the way I felt after laboring through nearly 300 pages of an emotional and repetitive rant titled Bamboozled! How America Loses the Intellectual Game with Japan and Its Implications for Our Future in Asia. The object of Hall's disaffection isn't necessarily the Japanese themselves - although he's certainly hard on those he has chosen to make a living among - but the U.S. intelligentsia and the political class. They're just, well, too damn naïve when it comes to Japan (Yawn here.).

In fact, Hall joins a substantial list of Japan observers who have thrown their hands up in exasperation. Unfortunately, Hall doesn't distinguish himself with his outspoken exasperation with the U.S. either. Frank Gibney's modern classic, Japan: The Fragile Superpower written at the onset of Japan's late 20th century renaissance, was entirely built around the premise of Western ignorance - both malevolent and benevolent - of Japan, its strengths, and its weaknesses. What Hall has provided is in ways an updated, and unworthy, version of Gibney's original argument that Westerners should spend more time and effort trying to understand what Japan is and why. The difference is that Gibney's work is enduring.

Gibney's book, which was updated for a third edition in 1996, provides still powerful insights into Japan because the author actually worked in the trenches there, first literally as an intelligence officer in World War II interrogating Japanese prisoners, and eventually as a business executive following a career in journalism, including a stint as Time magazine's Tokyo bureau chief. The Fragile Superpower was written in the 70s, when he was based in Japan as head of Encyclopedia Britannica for Japan and Korea.

Hall was also a journalist, but has always been an observer, rather than a participant, first as a student, then a journalist, and now an academic. He notes in his introduction that "I do think I have had enough experience from enough angles on Japan to qualify the following chapters as 'notes from the underground' - a counterintuitive challenge to our conventional wisdom that the intellectual game Japan plays with America (and others) hardly matters any more." But that statement was in reaction to a friend's good-natured critique, "'Ivan, you're a Japan jack-of-all-trades and master of none.'" I'm afraid the friend got it right.

Rather than counterintuitive, Hall is untiringly conventional. America is naïve, it is being willingly duped because the U.S. military and diplomatic corps need a powerful ally in the Asia Pacific, and its willingness to put up with Japanese intransigence over a wide spectrum of mutual interest issues - spanning defense to trade to Middle East alliances - is undermining American competitiveness. Worse, America may be abetting an increasingly apparent slide to the same sort of rightist extremism that fueled Japan's military expansionist policies in the first half of the last century. Will history repeat itself?

For Hall, that isn't a question. History is repeating itself. To illustrate his point, Hall points to Tokyo mayor Ishihara Shintaro and "his self-appointed role as Japan's political enfant terrible." In April 2000, Ishihara called on Japan's Self-Defense Forces to protect Japanese victims from foreigners who might "atrocious crimes," in the event of an earthquake disaster, a call Hall believes is rooted in long-standing racist attitudes toward non-Japanese - especially Asians - prevalent among rightists. In that, he's probably right. Ishihara referred to the foreigners as "sankokujin," or third-country nationalists, a term associated with "the wanton killing of thousands of Koreans in the panic following the great Kanto earthquake of 1923."

Hall says that 37 percent of the calls to city hall in the two days after Ishihara's speech were supportive of his stance, and notes that "considering that many of the 58 percent protesting his racist ranting were probably foreigners, the proportion of Japanese callers supporting him may have been much higher." Or they may not have been. And, who knows how many among 37 percent in support of Ishihara were from the well organized far right? Clearly, no one knows the answer to either of those questions.

But to support his suggestion that the average Japanese does lean to the right these recession-plagued days, Hall says "Given, too, that Tokyo's electorate is the nation's wealthiest and supposedly most internationalized, this (caller support for Ishihara) is the most ominous proof we have had to date of how far Japanese public sentiment has slid toward the xenophobic right." Well, if that's the most ominous proof he has, Hall doesn't have much of a soap box, in my view.

To state the obvious, the non-scientific tracking by a partisan government of calls to city hall is virtually meaningless to anyone not out to manipulate the results. As an academic, Hall should understand this. As a journalist, he knows the findings make a good story, whether they are significant in any meaningful way or not. Second, Ishihara's statements typically have little practical impact outside the media, and this instance was no exception. To the contrary, it is notable that Japanese courts are now levying stiff fines on even bathhouses that discriminate against foreigners. If you can lose millions of yen for not letting someone take a bath, imagine what can happen for more serious offenses.

Hall, in fact, misses the point almost entirely of Ishihara's election in 1999 as an independent following a career as a conservative, and frustrated, member of Japan's dominant political party, the Liberal Democrats, or LDP. Contrary to Hall's thinking, Ishihara believes that it is Japan that is being manipulated, not America, as he's argued in two not-very-thoughtful books. In the latest, Sensen Fukoku No to Ieru Nihon Keizai (The Japanese economy that can utter the declaration of war, "no"), Ishihara "depicted the Asian financial crisis as an American plot to establish global financial hegemony by undermining East Asian economies through the new 'opium' of 'money violence' - a 'second defeat of Japan' jealously engineered by the 'merciless American Jewish trio' of Madeleine Albright, Robert Rubin, and George Soros," as Hall himself points out.

The point I want to make, though, is not that Hall and Ishihara sound an awful lot alike when they worry about the relationship between their countries. Instead, it is that Ishihara's popularity among voters represents growing dissatisfaction with Japan Inc; ie, the LDP and traditional, do-nothing politicians. This is not a new argument. In fact, I first made it in an opinion piece titled "A Radical Fix for Japan" published in The Asian Wall Street Journal in April 2001. My argument, was - and still is - that if mainstream politicians don't change the way they do things, voters will desert them. Which means Ishihara could be more than just a mayor. He could become prime minister.

But not because Japan is sliding inexorably to the right. Rather, because Japan is going no where, and the Japanese want that to change. If Ishihara, with all his faults, is the only politician willing to take on that task, he might get it. After all, the patient Japanese have spent more than a decade waiting for someone else to do the job. It's not unrealistic to assume that eventually they'll get tired of waiting.
The bottom line on Bamboozled! is that it may be Hall who's trying to pull a fast one. Who's getting bamboozled is clearly in the eye of the beholder. But one thing's for certain, and that is that regardless of which side of the Pacific your standing, Hall's not arguing anything very original or insightful. What he does do is provide a meandering, mostly anecdotal commentary meant to shake America to its senses. I'm not sure that's necessary, but I am sure this book isn't going to wake anyone up even if it is.

(Michael Alan Hamlin is the managing director of consultancy TeamAsia and the author of three books on Asian economies and companies. His latest book is Marketing Asian Places, of which he is a co-author (Wiley, 2001). Write him at mahamlin@teamasia.com.).

Copyright © 2002 Michael Alan Hamlin. All Rights Reserved.

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